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INTRODUCTION: LAYOFFS AND OLDER WORKER PROTECTION 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, between December 
2016 and December 2017, around 1.6 million workers in the United 
States were laid off or discharged each month.1  When employers are 
faced with the decision to reduce workforce size, which occurs even 
during stronger economic times, numerous legal issues arise if the 
reduction is not executed properly.2  Federal and state law govern the 
workforce reduction process, but certain classes of workers receive 
more protection than others.3 
Older workers have received considerable protection over the past 
fifty years through the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (“ADEA”), which makes it illegal to discriminate against 
employees over the age of forty due to their age.4  Even under the 
ADEA, an employee may waive an age discrimination claim if such a 
waiver is “knowing and voluntary.”5  Waivers of claims occur when 
companies offer departing employees severance payments in 
exchange for those employees relinquishing their rights to sue the 
company over certain types of claims.6  In essence, when an employee 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. See Table 5, Layoffs and Discharges Levels and Rates by Industry and 
Region, Seasonally Adjusted, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Feb. 6, 
2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/jolts.t05.htm [http://perma.cc/4W8K-SGKX]. 
 2. Executive Legal Summary 396, Reductions in Force, Westlaw (database 
updated Dec. 2017). 
 3. See id. 
 4. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202 (codified 
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012)). 
 5. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (“An individual may not waive any right or claim under 
this chapter unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary.”). 
 6. See Whiteford, Taylor, Preston LLP, Severance Agreements: Drafting Tips to 
Make Sure They Stick – Part 1, MD. EMP. L. LETTER (Sept. 2009). 
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signs a severance agreement, he agrees not to assert any legal claims 
against the employer, marking the end of their employment 
relationship.7  Severance agreements are powerful tools that “buy[ ] 
peace” for the employer and can mean additional compensation for 
the employee.8  Some employers have historically taken advantage of 
these tools, going as far as manipulating or coercing employees into 
waiving their ADEA rights for the security of obtaining a signed 
agreement, knowing the employee can never sue again.9 
To combat this, Congress amended the ADEA by enacting the 
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 (“OWBPA”), which, 
in part, clarified what it meant for an employee to “knowingly and 
voluntarily” waive an age discrimination claim.10  The OWBPA re-
iterated that ADEA waivers must be “knowing and voluntary,” a 
contract term that sets the standard for what it means to consent to 
something by ensuring that the signee understands that it is his or her 
choice whether or not to enter into an agreement and requiring that 
such a decision is voluntary and is made knowingly.11  Importantly, 
the OWBPA includes a unique series of specific notice and 
information requirements as necessary elements for a waiver to 
qualify as knowing and voluntary.12 
The need for employee protections became clear during the 
economic recessions of the 1970s and 1980s.13  In an attempt to 
remain compliant with the 1978 ADEA amendment that prohibited 
arbitrary terminations of older workers, employers began offering 
special early retirement deals known as “golden handshakes,” which 
                                                                                                                                         
 7. MICHAEL DELIKAT, ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, STRATEGIES IN 
DRAFTING EFFECTIVE SEPARATION AGREEMENTS 2 (2008). 
 8. Id. 
 9. S. REP. NO. 101-79, at 968 (1989) (“Other older workers who testified before 
the Subcommittee on Labor described signing waivers without knowing or 
understanding the facts of any claim they might have.”). 
 10. 29 U.S.C. § 626; 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22 (2017). 
 11. See generally Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 01-3894, 2016 WL 2619853, at 
*7 (E.D. Pa. May 4, 2016) (denying Allstate’s request for a new trial because the jury 
instructions regarding OWBPA compliance, in which Plaintiffs argued that 
determining whether a release was signed “knowingly and voluntarily” required 
giving employees a “meaningful choice,” were not misleading: “If the ordinary 
contract principle of procedural unconscionability mandates a showing of 
‘meaningful choice,’ it is logical the ‘more stringent’ voluntariness standard under the 
totality of the circumstances test would have to meet, at a minimum, the same 
standard.”). 
 12. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A)–(H). 
 13. Jonathan Peterson, Early Retirement: The Golden Handshake—or Shove?, 
L.A. TIMES (June 7, 1985), http://articles.latimes.com/1985-06-07/news/mn-15975_1_
early-retirement/2 [http://perma.cc/P6HK-JH9K]. 
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were cash inducements for older workers to retire.14  These take-it-or-
leave-it inducements put pressure on employees, because they were 
given little time to decide if they should sign up, and made older 
workers, even those who could not afford to do so, feel like they had 
to retire.15  Older workers affected by these programs had little 
reason to suspect that the severance packages they were offered could 
have been an act of unlawful age discrimination under the ADEA.16  
During this same time period, older workers were also generally 
unable to tell whether they were selected for an involuntary 
Reduction in Force (“RIF”) program based solely on their age, which 
is per-se age discrimination.17  The OWBPA offers older employees 
enhanced protection against these types of discrimination.18 
This Note will evaluate the first twenty-five years of practice under 
this novel federal statutory approach to waiving rights, suggest areas 
for improvement, and demonstrate how the OWBPA could act as a 
model for discrimination claim waivers in other statutory settings.  
Though this Note argues that the OWBPA has provided a higher 
level of protection to older workers, the OWBPA has not completely 
remedied the issue of age discrimination in the United States.19  
There is still room for improvement, particularly through clarification 
of select OWBPA waiver provisions. 
Part I describes the background of the OWBPA.  Part II examines 
the statutory ambiguity that has arisen since the passage of the 
OWBPA, and how courts have attempted to clarify this ambiguity.  
Part III proposes that the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) can reinterpret select elements of the 
OWBPA and suggests a legislative amendment to other anti-
                                                                                                                                         
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See generally Virginia L. Hardwick & Tiffanie C. Benfer, Proving Disparate 
Treatment in a Reduction in Force: Ideas to Help Plaintiff’s Counsel Demonstrate 
Pretext, AM. BAR ASS’N, Nov. 4, 2011, at 1, https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2011/ac2011/017.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3P77-TFP3]. See also Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 
130 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating the evidence of an involuntary RIF must lead the 
factfinder to reasonably conclude either (1) the defendant consciously refused to 
consider relocating or retaining a plaintiff because of his age or (2) that the defendant 
regarded age as a negative factor in such consideration). 
 18. See generally GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., EARLY RETIREMENT 
INCENTIVE PLANS AND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (2010). 
 19. See Liz Ryan, The Ugly Truth About Age Discrimination, FORBES 
(Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/lizryan/2014/01/31/the-ugly-truth-about-
age-discrimination/#316ce0471f1e [http://perma.cc/TXE9-PGXX]. 
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discrimination laws that would codify the knowing and voluntary 
standard in a similar way to how it is codified under the OWBPA.  
The purpose of this Note is to act as a starting point to spark 
conversation about raising the bar of the knowing and voluntary 
standard for waiver agreements signed by employees facing layoffs 
and to show how increased disclosures can be beneficial to both 
employers and employees in the workforce reduction process. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Under the ADEA, passed in 1967, it is unlawful to discriminate 
against a person because of his or her age with respect to any term, 
condition, or privilege of employment, including hiring, firing, 
promotion, layoff, compensation, benefits, job assignments, and 
training.20  The ADEA permits employers to favor older workers 
based on age even when doing so adversely affects a younger worker 
who is forty years of age or older.21  The ADEA is enforced by the 
EEOC, a federal agency responsible for implementing and overseeing 
federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, or genetic 
information.22 
In 1990, Congress passed the OWBPA, which amended the ADEA 
in order to bolster the ADEA and realize its original goals, in 
response to some employers manipulating or coercing employees into 
waiving their ADEA rights.23  In the late 1980s, Congress grew 
concerned about employers taking advantage of older workers due to 
the workers’ lack of information or expertise regarding age 
discrimination law, combined with the fact that older workers 
increasingly became the targets of corporate down-sizing.24  To this 
end, the OWBPA amended Section 7 of the ADEA to include a 
                                                                                                                                         
 20. Facts About Age Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/age.cfm [https://perma.cc/97NH-BEH3]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Administrative Enforcement and Litigation, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/enforcement_litigation.cfm 
[http://perma.cc/WQT3-UNUG]. 
 23. S. REP. NO. 101-79, at 968 (1989). 
 24. Id. (“2. Lack of information or expertise.  Other older workers who testified 
before the Subcommittee on Labor described signing waivers without knowing or 
understanding the facts of any claim they might have.  The demographics of cost-
cutting are seldom shared by employers with their workforce.”); Waivers Under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Joint Hearing Before the Select Comm. on 
Aging & the Subcomm. on Emp’t Opportunities of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 
101st Cong. 1003–04 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Joint Hearing Before the Select Comm. 
on Aging] (statement of Edward R. Roybal, Chairman, Select Comm. on Aging). 
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statutory definition of a knowing and voluntary waiver of an ADEA 
claim.25 
A. The Origins of the OWBPA: Supervision Requirements 
Prior to the enactment of the OWBPA, an important unanswered 
question before the EEOC and federal courts was whether an ADEA 
waiver had to be supervised by the EEOC or the federal courts in 
order to be valid.26  Did the government need to get involved in the 
contracting between employers and employees over age 
discrimination concerns? 
The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), which established the 
minimum wage, among other things, has such a supervisory 
requirement.27  One cannot consent to work for less than what is 
prescribed by the FLSA without the consent of the Department of 
Labor or a court, and courts have imposed strict limitations on when 
and how claims under the FLSA can be settled.28  Advocates for an 
ADEA supervision requirement noted the ADEA’s incorporation of 
the FLSA’s enforcement procedures, implying incorporation of its 
accompanying supervision requirement.29  However, in 1986, the 
Sixth Circuit rejected this argument and a supervision requirement 
for the ADEA in Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp.30  The 
court held that under particular circumstances, employers and 
employees may negotiate a valid release of ADEA claims privately 
and without government supervision.31  Further, the court noted that 
the EEOC, at the time, specifically proposed guidance allowing for 
unsupervised waivers with the intent of encouraging voluntary 
                                                                                                                                         
 25. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (2012). 
 26. Craig Robert Senn, Knowing and Voluntary Waivers of Federal Employment 
Claims: Replacing the Totality of Circumstances Test with a “Waiver Certainty” 
Test, 58 FLA. L. REV. 305, 313 (2006). 
 27. See Compliance Assistance – Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/ [http://perma.cc/
H5ND-PEZ3]. 
 28. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)–(c) (2012); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 
697, 704 (1945) (holding that “in the absence of a bona fide dispute between the 
parties as to liability,” one cannot release one’s right to liquidated damages under 
§ 16(b)). 
 29. See 1989 Joint Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Aging, supra note 24, at 
1005. 
 30. 787 F.2d 1039, 1040 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 31. Id. at 1043. 
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resolution of ADEA disputes and the court agreed with the agency’s 
views.32 
In 1987, the EEOC issued a final rule permitting older workers to 
waive their rights without supervision.33  Justice Clarence Thomas, 
the then-Chairman of the EEOC, explained in a letter to the United 
States Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources that 
mandating a supervision requirement impractically increases the 
workload of the government while limiting an employee’s existing 
choice to waive his or her rights privately, without first filing an age 
discrimination complaint with the EEOC.34  The EEOC advised that 
its regulation permitting older workers to waive their rights without 
supervision was “adequate to protect employees against pressure to 
waive their rights while preserving their choice to waive without filing 
a claim with the EEOC or in court.”35 
However, despite the EEOC’s assurances, Congress feared that the 
EEOC’s position would not adequately protect older workers and 
proposed House Bill 1432 and Senate Bill 54, which comprised the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Waiver Protection Act of 1989.36  
The proposed legislation provided that ADEA waivers were invalid 
except when employers obtained the waiver in a settlement of an 
older worker’s charge of age discrimination or where the waiver was 
reviewed by a court.37 
One side of the supervision requirement debate can be 
demonstrated by the testimony of Chairman Edward R. Roybal of the 
U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Aging. In his 
opening statement in the April 18, 1989 Joint Hearing before the 
Select Committee on Aging and the Subcommittee on Employment 
Opportunities of the Committee on Education and Labor, he alleged 
that the EEOC’s position on supervision violated congressional intent 
because it permitted employers to extract the waiver of rights from 
                                                                                                                                         
 32. Id. at 1045; Senn, supra note 26, at 332–33 (“From 1986 through 1990, five 
federal circuits—the Second Circuit in Bormann, the Third Circuit in Coventry, the 
Fifth Circuit in O’Hare, the Sixth Circuit in Runyan, and the Eighth Circuit in 
Lancaster—concluded that a person could privately waive an ADEA claim without 
government supervision.”). 
 33. Legislative Regulation and Administrative Exemption Allowing for Non-
EEOC Supervised Waivers Under the ADEA, 39 C.F.R. § 1627 (1987). 
 34. See 1989 Joint Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Aging, supra note 24, at 
1130 (letter from Clarence Thomas, Chairman, EEOC). 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. at 1106 (statement of Edward R. Roybal, Chairman, Select Comm. on 
Aging). 
 37. See id. 
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older workers coercively due to the inherently unequal relationship 
between employee and employer.38  “Employers should not be 
permitted to exploit their superior bargaining position, and the 
vulnerable conditions of their older employees, by forcing them to 
sign away their rights.”39 
The other side of the argument emphasizes that employees and 
employers should be able to freely contract with each other.40  Mark 
Dichter, a prominent labor and employment defense attorney, 
demonstrated such a position when testifying on his own behalf 
during a hearing before the Subcommittee on Labor of the 
Committee on Labor and Human Resources of the United States 
Senate on March 16, 1989.41  Mr. Dichter explained that 
Senate Bill 54 was “unreasonable, unworkable and inconsistent with 
the ADEA and the national employment policy to encourage 
voluntary resolutions of potential disputes.”42  He noted that 
responsible employers already ensured that employees, when given 
the opportunity to sign a release, were not discouraged from seeking 
the advice of counsel in connection with the release and were 
provided with a reasonable period of time to consider whether or not 
to enter into such an agreement.43  As his testimony was given prior 
to the passage of the OWBPA’s set waiver provisions, Mr. Dichter 
predicted that employers would view the knowing and voluntary 
standard as inherently reasonable: “I do not believe that most 
responsible employers would object to including specified language in 
their releases which would inform employees of their rights under the 
ADEA and encourage employees to consult with either the EEOC or 
a private attorney prior to entering into the release.”44 
The Supreme Court’s June 1989 decision in Public Employees 
Retirement Systems of Ohio v. Betts45 interrupted the debate over 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Waiver Protection Act of 
1989.  Betts did not concern the issue of the validity of ADEA 
waivers, which makes the details of the case irrelevant to this Note.  It 
                                                                                                                                         
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. at 1104. 
 40. Age Discrimination in Employment Waiver Protection Act of 1989: Hearing 
on S. 54 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 
101st Cong. 1209 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Hearing on S. 54 ] (statement of Mark 
Dichter). 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. at 1203. 
 44. See id. at 1207. 
 45. 492 U.S. 158 (1989). 
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did, however, re-establish Congress’s opposition to age discrimination 
in the employee benefits area and set the stage for the passage of the 
OWBPA.46  It is important to recognize that the true genesis of the 
waiver provisions of the OWBPA originated with the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Waiver Protection Act of 1989. 
B. Compliance with the OWBPA Waiver Provisions 
The OWBPA codified what is functionally equivalent to the 
knowing and voluntary standard by establishing a two-tiered scheme 
for evaluating the legal sufficiency of a voluntary waiver of an 
employee’s ADEA rights.47  The first tier establishes the minimum 
requirements that must be met in order for a release agreement to be 
enforceable.48  The Supreme Court held in Oubre v. Entergy 
Operations, Inc.49 that a waiver may not be considered knowing and 
voluntary unless, at a minimum, it satisfies these enumerated 
requirements.50  The second tier includes additional statutory 
requirements for waivers “requested in connection with an exit 
incentive or other employment termination program offered to a 
group or a class of employees.”51 
Before the passage of the OWBPA, courts, by default, had the 
discretion to determine which factors made waivers of discrimination 
claims knowing and voluntary.52  Some courts relied strictly on 
traditional contract principles to determine the validity of releases, 
while others required an examination of the totality of the 
circumstances.53  The stringent contract approach looked to ordinary 
contract principles to evaluate the legal sufficiency of waiver 
agreements, such as whether proper consideration was given in 
exchange for the waiver and the absence of fraud, duress, or mutual 
                                                                                                                                         
 46. Mark D. Pomfret, All Betts Are Off: How Employers Should View Older 
Workers’ Benefit Protection Act, 18 J. LEGIS. 87, 88 (1992). 
 47. See generally U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, UNDERSTANDING 
WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS IN EMPLOYEE SEVERANCE AGREEMENTS 
(2009) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS], 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_severance-agreements.html [http://perma.cc/
P363-A66Y]. 
 48. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A)–(F)(i), (G) (2012). 
 49. 522 U.S. 422 (1998). 
 50. Id. at 422. 
 51. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(F)(ii). 
 52. See Senn, supra note 26, at 310–11. 
 53. See id. at 309. 
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mistake.54  By contrast, courts that employed the more deferential 
totality of circumstances approach looked to other factors to 
determine whether a waiver was entered knowingly and voluntarily.55  
For example, the Third Circuit, in Coventry v. United States Steel 
Corp.,56 considered the following factors when determining whether 
or not ADEA-related claims were sufficiently waived: 
1) the plaintiff’s education and business experience, 2) the amount 
of the time the plaintiff had possession of or access to the agreement 
before signing it, 3) the role of plaintiff in deciding the terms of the 
agreement, 4) the clarity of the agreement, 5) whether the plaintiff 
was represented by or consulted with an attorney, and 6) whether 
the consideration given in exchange for the waiver exceeds 
employee benefits to which the employee was already entitled by 
contract or law.57 
The Second Circuit adopted this totality of the circumstances 
approach prior to the passage of the OWBPA.58  The court used the 
factors enumerated in Coventry and added a seventh factor: whether 
an employer encourages an employee to consult, or discourages an 
employee from consulting, an attorney.59  The court noted that the 
Third Circuit’s totality of the circumstances standard was consistent 
with the congressional purpose underlying the ADEA and stressed 
the need to carefully examine any situation in which an older worker 
bargains away the statutory right to be free from age discrimination.60 
While many of the ultimately codified requirements of the knowing 
and voluntary standard were drawn from case law, academic 
literature, and even other statutes,61 the OWBPA took the critical 
step to make these factors mandatory.  Such factors include, at a 
minimum, that: 
 The waiver is written in a manner calculated to be understood by 
the average individual eligible to participate; 
 The individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for 
consideration; 
                                                                                                                                         
 54. Judith Droz Keyes & Douglas J. Farmer, Settlement of Age Discrimination 
Claims—The Meaning and Impact of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 
12 LAB. LAW. 261, 275 (1996). 
 55. Id. 
 56. 856 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 57. Id. at 523 (citing DiMartino v. City of Hartford, 636 F. Supp. 1241 (D. Conn. 
1986)). 
 58. Bormann v. AT&T Comm., Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
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 The individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney 
prior to signing the agreement; 
 The individual is given at least 21 days to consider the agreement 
or at least 45 if in connection with an exit incentive or other 
termination program offered to a group or class of employees; 
 If in connection with an exit incentive or other employment 
termination program offered to a group or class of employees, 
the employer must inform the employee  in writing and in 
manner calculated to be understood by the average employee, 
the class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such program, 
any eligibility factors for such program, and any time limits 
applicable to such program; as well as the job titles and ages of 
all individuals eligible or selected for the program, and the ages 
of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational 
unit who are not eligible or selected for the program.62 
Although the OWBPA established a framework for determining 
the minimum conditions under which a waiver can be deemed a 
knowing and voluntary release of one’s ADEA rights, employees 
retain recourse in traditional contract defenses such as fraud, 
coercion, and mutual mistake.63  In other words, if an employer 
proves that all of the statutory minimums have been satisfied, then an 
employee may still be able to prove that the waiver was not knowing 
and voluntary.64 
For example, the appellants in Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co.65 
argued that the releases they signed as part of a termination program 
violated the OWBPA because they were fraudulently induced into 
doing so.66  Coors, however, argued that the releases were valid 
because they complied with the express requirements of the 
OWBPA.67  On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
                                                                                                                                         
 62. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A)–(H) (2012). 
 63. Id. § 626(f)(3) (“In any dispute that may arise over whether any of the 
requirements, conditions, and circumstances set forth in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), 
(D), (E), (F), (G), or (H) of paragraph (1), or subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph 
(2), have been met, the party asserting the validity of a waiver shall have the burden 
of proving in a court of competent jurisdiction that a waiver was knowing and 
voluntary pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2).”). 
 64. See id. § 626(f)(1); see also Griffin v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 62 F.3d 368, 373–
74 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding “nonstatutory circumstances, such as fraud, duress, or 
coercion in connection with the execution of the waiver, may render an ADEA 
waiver not ‘knowing and voluntary’” and remanding the case for the district court to 
consider these factors under the totality of the circumstances). 
 65. 189 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 66. Id. at 1228. 
 67. Id. 
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grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s age discrimination 
claims, and remanded the case to consider whether the releases were 
valid in light of appellant’s fraud allegation.68  The court noted that 
fraud may render an ADEA waiver not knowing and voluntary, even 
though Coors met the statutory minimums outlined in the OWBPA.69 
In sum, the OWBPA’s strict and detailed waiver requirements 
provide a presumptive, but not automatic, protection for employers.70  
Even if the employer meets the above standards in subsections (A)–
(H) in a release agreement, a court could still find that the agreement 
violated the OWBPA if the employee did not sign it knowingly and 
voluntarily through traditional contract defenses, as seen in the Coors 
case.71  Still, the extensive requirements set forth in (A)–(H) do act as 
a floor from which employers must craft their release agreements.72 
1. A Decrease in ADEA-Related Charges Filed in Federal  
District Court 
This strict-compliance standard established by the OWBPA has led 
employers to err on the side of caution when creating release 
agreements to avoid what amounts to a kind of double jeopardy if the 
release were to be invalidated.73  Since the Supreme Court decided 
Oubre in 1998 and held that an employee’s release of claims under 
the ADEA is unenforceable if the release is not compliant with 
OWBPA protections, the number of EEOC enforcement suits 
involving ADEA claims that were filed and resolved in federal 
district courts has decreased, despite a spike in 2006.74 
From 1999 until 2007, around forty ADEA-related cases were filed 
and resolved in federal district court each year.75  Beginning in 2007, 
the rate began to gradually decline and in 2016, only two cases were 
                                                                                                                                         
 68. Id. at 1239. 
 69. Id. at 1229. 
 70. See id. at 1229 (holding that “non-statutory circumstances such as fraud, 
duress, or mutual mistake may render an ADEA waiver not ‘knowing and voluntary’ 
under the OWBPA”). 
 71. Id. at 1228–29. 
 72. See generally Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 (1988). 
 73. Id. at 427. 
 74. EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
litigation.cfm [http://perma.cc/7N8V-SDVH].  Fifty EEOC enforcement suits were 
filed and resolved in the federal district courts in 2006 compared to forty-four in 1998, 
thirty-two in 2007, and fourteen in 2015. Id.  Statistics specifically regarding ADEA 
waiver litigation could not be found.  I assume the decrease in the number of cases 
also correlates to a decrease in ADEA waiver litigation. 
 75. See id. 
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brought.76  Without adequate research, it is difficult to determine 
what caused this decrease; however, an employment attorney at a 
prominent defense firm opined that (1) the Supreme Court’s Oubre 
decision and (2) the EEOC’s strategic enforcement plan changes are 
likely two motivating factors.77  Further, the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”) could have led many of these cases to be resolved privately 
in arbitration instead of in court. 
a. Oubre and Its Effect on Waiver Compliance 
One possible reason for the decline in EEOC enforcement suits 
brought in federal court is the Oubre decision.78  Oubre helped to 
discipline employers into ensuring age waivers are signed knowingly 
and voluntarily because if not, employers are not only vulnerable to 
an ADEA suit, but also cannot claw back the original consideration 
given to the employee in exchange for his or her signature on that 
waiver.79  The Supreme Court in Oubre held that if a release did not 
comply with the OWBPA’s requirements, it could not bar an 
employee from keeping the benefits received from signing the 
release, even though the release was invalidated.80  Respondent 
Entergy Operations, Inc. (“Entergy”) argued that under general 
principles of contract jurisprudence, before an innocent party can 
elect to void the contract he entered into, he must first tender back 
any benefits received under that contract.81  Furthermore, Entergy 
argued that under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a party is barred 
from shirking the burdens of a voidable transaction for as long as she 
retains the benefits received under it.82  Therefore, Entergy reasoned, 
an employee essentially ratifies an otherwise ineffective release 
agreement by retaining the consideration.83 
The Court disagreed, stating that the rule proposed by Entergy 
would frustrate the OWBPA’s practical operation.84  The Court 
explained that it was common for a discharged employee to have 
already spent the consideration money and to “lack the means to 
                                                                                                                                         
 76. Id. 
 77. Telephone Interview with Senior Counsel, Unnamed Law Firm (Oct. 4, 2016) 
(notes on file with author). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 428 (1988). 
 81. Id. at 425. 
 82. Id. at 425–26. 
 83. Id. at 426. 
 84. Id. at 427. 
852 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
tender their return.”85  Additionally, “[t]hese realities might tempt 
employers to risk noncompliance with the OWBPA’s waiver 
provisions, knowing it will be difficult to repay the monies and relying 
on ratification.  We ought not open the door to an evasion of the 
statute by this device.”86  Because employers will not be able to 
reclaim consideration money given to an employee in exchange for an 
invalid release, employers are likely more careful about ensuring a 
valid release that is compliant with the OWBPA requirements since 
the Oubre decision.  This added care likely has resulted in more 
compliant releases and thus, fewer complaints filed in federal court. 
b. The EEOC’s Strategic Enforcement Plan 
Another possible explanation for this decrease could be the 
EEOC’s strategic enforcement plan.87  The EEOC’s Strategic Plan for 
Fiscal Years 2013 to 2016 had six priorities: (1) eliminating barriers in 
recruitment and hiring; (2) protecting immigrant, migrant, and other 
vulnerable workers; (3) addressing emerging and developing issues 
(i.e. issues associated with new legislation, judicial decisions, and 
administrative interpretations); (4) enforcing equal pay laws; 
(5) preserving access to the legal system; and (6) preventing 
harassment through systemic enforcement and targeted outreach.88  
Notably absent from these priorities is combating age discrimination, 
and its absence indicates that it has not been a particular focus of the 
EEOC over the past five or so years.  As a result, these cases are not 
as attractive to the EEOC for litigation. 
c. The FAA’s Effect on EEOC Enforcement Actions 
Lastly, the decrease could also be due to the United States 
Arbitration Act, more commonly referred to as the FAA.89  The 
FAA provides for contractually-based compulsory and binding 
arbitration, setting out the legislative framework for the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements and awards in the United States.90  The 
FAA provides that if a party to a contract containing an arbitration 
clause initiates contract-related litigation, either party can compel the 
                                                                                                                                         
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Strategic Enforcement 
Plan FY 2013-2016, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Sept. 4, 2012), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/sep.cfm [http://perma.cc/ZH9Z-K2UZ]. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 90. Id. 
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moving party to resolve the dispute through arbitration.91  Supreme 
Court decisions over the last several decades have reinforced the 
FAA’s pro-arbitration mandate and ensured that it is universally 
applied by both state and federal courts.92  As a result of cases like 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.93 and Circuit City Stores, 
Inc. v. Adams94 many ADEA claims are resolved in arbitration rather 
than in court.95 
2. An Increase in ADEA-Related Charges Filed with the EEOC 
Although there has been a decrease in the number of ADEA-
related EEOC enforcement actions brought and resolved in federal 
district court over the past ten years, there has been an increase in the 
total number of ADEA-related charges filed with the EEOC.96  
These statistics indicate that older workers are exercising their rights 
under the ADEA and remain targets of discrimination. 
In 2005, there were 16,585 charges filed with the EEOC alleging 
ADEA violations—including those filed concurrently under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), and/or the Equal Pay Act of 1963 
(“EPA”)—and in 2015, there were 20,144.97 
According to a Pew Research Center analysis of employment data 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics from 2016, Americans ages sixty-
five and older are working more than at any time since the beginning 
of the twenty-first century.98  This suggests that the increase in 
charges filed under the ADEA with the EEOC is likely due, in part, 
to older Americans working longer than they have in recent history.  
In May 2016, 18.8% of Americans ages sixty-five and older reported 
                                                                                                                                         
 91. 9 U.S.C. § 4. 
 92. Claudia Salomon & Samuel de Villiers, The United States Federal Arbitration 
Act: A Powerful Tool for Enforcing Arbitration Agreements and Arbitral Awards, 
LEXISNEXIS (Apr. 17, 2014), https://m.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/the-us-fed-
arbitration-act [http://perma.cc/46XF-4773]. 
 93. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 94. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 95. See generally Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105; Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20. See also 
discussion infra Section II.A.3. 
 96. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 
1997–FY 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/statistics/enforcement/adea.cfm [http://perma.cc/ZN2V-5H29]. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Drew DeSilver, More Older Americans Are Working, and Working More, 
than They Used to, PEW RES. CTR. (June 20, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/06/20/more-older-americans-are-working-and-working-more-than-they-
used-to/ [http://perma.cc/7XKQ-RKHY]. 
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being employed full or part-time as compared to 12.8% in May 2000.99  
These statistics indicate that with more workers still vulnerable to age 
discrimination, it is even more important to clarify laws governing 
their treatment in the workplace. 
II.  EMPLOYERS PUT IN A CHALLENGING POSITION WHEN 
CONDUCTING RIFS 
Enacting RIF programs can present difficulties for employers, 
particularly regarding the creation of OWBPA-mandated age 
disclosures needed for exit incentive or other termination 
programs.100  The purpose of age disclosures is to inform the selected 
employee of how many other employees, ages forty or older, were 
selected for termination.  Despite the statutory requirements, the 
disclosure included in a release agreement can be ambiguous or even 
misleading.101 
This Part outlines the effect of disclosures on the knowing and 
voluntary nature of a terminated employee’s age waiver.  It also 
highlights the issues courts have struggled with when attempting to 
clarify ambiguities of the OWBPA requirements.  The diverging 
processes taken by courts when evaluating this standard can lead to 
differing outcomes, leaving both employees and employers 
vulnerable. 
Section II.A delves into three principal ambiguities in the 
OWBPA: how to define job classification or organizational units, the 
substance of disclosure requirements, and which courts qualify as 
courts of competent jurisdiction.  Section II.B discusses the influence 
the OWBPA has had over the various ways courts determine whether 
waivers of analogous anti-discrimination protections, such as those 
under Title VII or the ADA, are made knowingly and voluntarily.  
These sections intend to demonstrate how employers are given 
ambiguous guidance regarding a compliant RIF, placing them in a 
precarious position. 
                                                                                                                                         
 99. Id. 
 100. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H) (2012). 
 101. See generally Raczak v. Ameritech Corp., 103 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1997); 
Griffin v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 62 F.3d 368, 371 (11th Cir. 1995); Pagliolo v. 
Guidant Corp., 483 F. Supp. 2d 847 (D. Minn. 2007). 
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A. Less-than-Clear Requirements Under the OWBPA 
Though the OWBPA was passed about twenty-six years ago, courts 
are still construing the most detailed subpart of the waiver section, 
which regulates information disclosures in group terminations.102 
1. Job Classification or Organizational Units 
In particular, the language in the waiver provision of § 626(f)(1)(H) 
tends to generate a considerable amount of confusion among both 
employers and employees.103  This section specifies that when an 
employer requests a waiver as part of an exit incentive program or 
other employment termination program, the employer must inform 
the individual in writing of: 
(i) any class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such program, 
any eligibility factors for such program, and any time limits 
applicable to such program; and (ii) the job titles and ages of all 
individuals eligible or selected for the program, and the ages of all 
individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who 
are not eligible or selected for the program.104 
The exact scope and manner in which an employer defines the class 
or unit is unclear, as are specific disclosure requirements. 
a. Defining “Job Classification or Organizational Unit” 
To aid in defining the unit of individuals covered by a reduction 
program, the EEOC issued a regulation in 1998 to clarify the 
OWBPA’s required disclosure of the job titles and ages of all 
employees eligible or selected for the program, as well as the ages of 
all employees in the same job classification or organizational unit who 
are not eligible or selected for the program.105  According to the 
regulation, a job classification or organizational unit is determined by 
examining the “decisional unit” at issue.106  The term “decisional 
unit,” a term created by the EEOC, has been developed to reflect the 
in-scope, broad population for an exercise in which an employer 
selects and rules out individuals for participation.107 
The EEOC regulation gives examples of decisional units ranging 
from an entire facility to a group of employees who report to the 
                                                                                                                                         
 102. See, e.g., Raczak, 103 F.3d at 1259; Griffin, 62 F.3d at 371. 
 103. See Raczak, 103 F.3d at 1268. 
 104. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H)(i)–(ii). 
 105. Id. § 626(f)(1)(H)(ii). 
 106. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(1)(iii)(C) (2017). 
 107. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(3). 
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same person.108  It is clear from both the text of the statute and the 
EEOC regulation that employers have significant discretion to 
determine an organizational unit under § 626(f)(1)(H)(ii).109  
Commentators have emphasized that too much employer discretion 
to define the organizational unit could lead to inaccurate 
disclosure.110  Likewise, concerns remain that ambiguous disclosure 
requirements make it difficult for terminated older workers to 
understand what information the disclosure is revealing.  Often 
employees do not know, either in technical or in precise terms, 
whether they belong to a certain “class,” “unit,” or a “group” of 
employees.111  Without this knowledge, it can be challenging for a 
terminated older worker to make sense of a disclosure, let alone to 
recognize if he or she has a valid ADEA claim. 
b. Conflicting Court Approaches 
Despite somewhat sparse case law on this issue, there are a few 
federal and state cases that illustrate the conflict among courts as to 
how to interpret § 626(f)(1)(H)(ii).  This legal uncertainty has 
potentially serious consequences for employers: disclosing too much 
or too little job classification or organizational unit data in a release 
could lead to the release being invalidated under the OWBPA.  Since 
there is little case law regarding how to define a decisional unit—and 
so few cases are brought by the EEOC to federal court relating to 
ADEA claims—employers are stuck operating in the dark.112 
Prior to the EEOC’s 1998 regulation, the Eleventh Circuit adopted 
a broad conception of a “job classification or organizational unit” in 
Griffin v. Kraft General Foods, Inc.113 by relying on the spirit of the 
ADEA, generally.  In Griffin, the court addressed whether employees 
                                                                                                                                         
 108. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(3)(iii)(A), (iv)(A) (providing an example of 
an entire facility being a decisional unit), with 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(3)(iii)(D), 
(iv)(D) (providing an example of decisional unit being employees reporting to a 
singular manager). 
 109. See Jon Hyman, Defining the Proper Decisional Unit Is Key in  
Legitimacy of RIFs, OHIO EMPLOYER’S L. BLOG (June 12, 2008), 
http://www.ohioemployerlawblog.com/2008/06/defining-proper-decisional-unit-is-
key.html [http://perma.cc/SC2G-9MY3]. 
 110. Id.; see also Raczak v. Ameritech Corp., 103 F.3d 1257, 1263 (1997) (regarding 
organizational units, as this case was decided pre-1998 EEOC guidance, “ . . . it is 
certainly possible that an employer will want to fiddle with the definition to mask the 
possible evidence for age discrimination”). 
 111. See generally Griffin v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 62 F.3d 368, 371 (11th Cir. 
1995). 
 112. See EEOC Litigation Statistics, supra note 74. 
 113. 62 F.3d at 368. 
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in the same job classification or organizational unit could include 
employees outside a single facility.114  A group of terminated 
employees from a closed Kraft Food plant sued under the ADEA on 
a theory that Kraft improperly defined the job classification or 
organizational unit as including the plant that remained open, leaving 
selected employees with little understanding of the waiver to which 
they were asked to consent.115  In denying the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment, the Eleventh Circuit stated that an issue of fact 
existed as to whether Kraft under-disclosed the organizational unit by 
not including all individuals considered, including those at separate 
plants.116  The court observed that neither job classification nor 
organizational unit was clearly defined in the OWBPA, and instead 
relied upon the broad remedial purpose of the ADEA to require the 
disclosure of the names of individuals considered in each of its 
plants.117 
The 1998 EEOC guidance on the subject informed employers that 
regardless of the type of program, the scope of the terms “class,” 
“unit,” “group,” “job classification,” and “organizational unit” is 
determined by examining the “decisional unit” at issue.118  This 
guidance still generated confusion, as different courts have relied on 
various aspects of the EEOC guidance and the plain text of the 
ADEA when attempting to define a “decisional unit.”  For example, 
in Pagliolo v. Guidant Corp.,119 the District Court of Minnesota relied 
on the requirement that information be conveyed “in writing in a 
manner calculated to be understood by the average participant” when 
determining the proper decisional unit, and the court held that the 
resulting release was invalid because it was objectively confusing to 
the average employee eligible for the plan.120  In this case, the 
Guidant Corporation, which at one time operated eighty-five 
different facilities throughout the United States, conducted a RIF as a 
result of a shortfall in revenues.121  Guidant considered more than 
8,700 employees to be part of the RIF and selection, itself, impacted 
around 700.122  The company considered its “decisional unit” to be 
                                                                                                                                         
 114. Id. at 372. 
 115. Id. at 371–72. 
 116. Id. at 373. 
 117. Id. at 372. 
 118. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(1)(iii)(C) (2017). 
 119. 483 F. Supp. 2d 847 (D. Minn. 2007). 
 120. Id. at 858 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H)(i) (2012)). 
 121. Id. at 851. 
 122. Id. at 852. 
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nearly all U.S.-based employees because “these employees were 
covered by the program and thus considered for termination in the 
RIF and for eligibility in the Severance Plan.”123  The court held that 
by listing nearly all U.S.-based employees, the employer did not 
properly disclose the decisional unit because conveying the names of 
so many individuals likely confused the average individual eligible for 
such a program.124  As a result, the release was invalid.125 
The Northern District Court of Iowa took a different approach in 
Behr v. AADG, Inc.126 and held that the defendant-employer’s 
classification of “decisional unit” was proper because it accurately 
reflected the group from which the employer selected employees to 
terminate.127  The plaintiff argued that the defendant-employer 
improperly labeled its RIF decisional unit as the “indirect labor 
group” when in reality the decisional unit was much smaller.128  The 
defendant contended that the decisional unit was indeed all 175 
employees in the “indirect labor group,” because plan management 
was instructed to reduce headcount of only employees in that specific 
group, and the employees in the direct production group were 
ineligible.129  The defendant identified fourteen employees to 
terminate, thirteen of whom were over forty.130  Defendant mailed 
each terminated employee an Exhibit A, which listed the fourteen 
selected employees by age and title, and an Exhibit B, consisting of a 
list of the ages of the 161 employees not selected.131  The court held 
that since the defendant only considered the indirect production 
employees, and that the plant employees clearly understood the terms 
of the “indirect labor group” to mean not the direct production 
employees, the decisional unit was proper.132 
All three of these cases rely on different aspects of the OWBPA 
and the ADEA when determining job classification or organizational 
unit.  The appropriateness of a job classification or organizational unit 
can vary based on the rationale on which a court relies: whether it is 
in the spirit of the ADEA, if a decisional unit is conveyed in a manner 
                                                                                                                                         
 123. Id. at 857–58. 
 124. Id. at 858. 
 125. Id. 
 126. No. 14-CV-3075-CJW, 2016 WL 4119692 (N.D. Iowa July 29, 2016). 
 127. Id. at *15. 
 128. Id. at *2. 
 129. Id. at *14. 
 130. Id. at *2. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at *14. 
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understood by the average participant, or how RIF selections were 
made.  Consistency in this area would provide clarity. 
2. Disclosure Requirements 
The substantive elements required in an age disclosure are 
similarly unclear, despite EEOC regulations interpreting the text of 
the OWBPA.  The EEOC regulations include the following salient 
provisions: 
Information regarding ages should be broken down by age of those 
eligible and selected as well as ages of those not eligible or selected. 
Age bands broader than 1 year are not appropriate. 
If the RIF includes employees terminated over various levels within 
the organization or with varying job titles, that information must be 
broken down by grade level or some other type of subcategory. 
If the disclosures combine information regarding voluntary and 
involuntary terminations, the employer must make clear which 
employees were part of which program. 
If selected employees are from a subset of a decisional unit, the 
employer still must disclose the entire decisional unit (i.e. if a 10% 
RIF is done in the Accounting Department under the direction that 
the bottom 1/3 will be terminated, the employer must still disclose 
information for all of the employees within that department).133 
In Behr, the plaintiffs contended that the Separation Agreement 
did not contain the eligibility factors that the employer considered 
when making RIF selections, in violation of § 626(f)(1)(A) and 
§ 626(f)(1)(H)(i), which requires disclosure of “eligibility factors for 
such program.”134  Defendant’s director of human resources testified 
that those selected in the RIF were selected for “many different 
reasons,” none of which were listed in the waiver.135  The district 
court held that it is sufficient for an employer to identify the group 
eligible for termination and that the employer is not required to 
identify the specific factors guiding which eligible employees to 
terminate based on the model waiver included in the regulation.136  
According to the regulation, an employer fulfills the eligibility factor 
by simply stating that “[a]ll persons in the [decisional unit] are eligible 
                                                                                                                                         
 133. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(4)(i)–(vii) (2017). 
 134. Behr, 2016 WL 4119692, at *4 (stating that if a waiver is in connection with an 
exit incentive program, the employer must disclose “any class, unit, or group of 
individuals covered by such program, any eligibility factors for such program, and any 
time limits applicable to such program,” respectively). 
 135. Id. at *12. 
 136. Id. at *14. 
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for the program.”137  The regulation seems to directly contradict a 
requirement of the statutory text, which understandably leads to 
disclosure requirement confusion. 
The Behr decision held that a disclosure must be meaningful to be 
valid, and that merely adhering to the actual text of the OWBPA will 
not protect an employer from a lawsuit.138  Further, in Behr, the 
defendant-employer believed that it was not required to disclose 
information related to employees not selected for the RIF because 
“job titles” is missing from the second part of the following OWBPA 
provision: “(ii) the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or 
selected for the program, and the ages of all individuals in the same 
classification or organizational unit who are not eligible or selected 
for the program.”139  The court held that although an employer did 
not have to provide the job titles of every employee not selected, it 
had to provide enough data to inform the employee of comparative 
information in an understandable manner.140  The court went on to 
explain that the primary purpose of a disclosure was to inform the 
terminated employee of possible age discrimination claims, and the 
data provided by the employer in this case was not meaningful.141 
As evidenced, regulations that contradict statutory text create 
judicial uncertainty in whether to adhere to statutory text, leaving 
employers vulnerable to ADEA suits based on this confusion. 
3. “Court of Competent Jurisdiction” 
Courts disagree as to which forums constitute a “court of 
competent jurisdiction” in which an ADEA case may be heard.  The 
text of the OWBPA requires that an employer prove the validity of a 
waiver in a “court of competent jurisdiction,” but provides no 
definition for this crucial term.142  Further complicating the issue, a 
provision passed as part of the 1978 amendment to the ADEA states 
that “any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of 
competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will 
effectuate the purposes of this Act . . . .”143  Without a clear definition 
of a “court of competent jurisdiction,” employers and employees 
alike face considerable confusion as, oftentimes, forum can affect the 
                                                                                                                                         
 137. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(4)(vii)(B). 
 138. See generally Behr, 2016 WL 4119692, at *16. 
 139. See id. at *9–10 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H)(ii) (2012)). 
 140. Id. at *16. 
 141. Id. 
 142. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(3). 
 143. Id. § 626(c)(1). 
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outcome of a case.144  The Supreme Court addressed this confusion in 
Gilmer and found that Congress did not intend to preclude a waiver 
of judicial access based on the language of the 1978 amendment of 
§ 626(c)(1).145  As a result, an ADEA claim can be subject to 
compulsory arbitration and heard by an arbitrator rather than in 
court or by a judge.  Despite this ruling, lower courts have found 
some exceptions to this general rule.146 
When presented with a similar issue, the United States District 
Court for the District of Minnesota in McLeod v. General Mills, 
Inc.147 ascertained congressional intent based on the language of 
another provision of the OWBPA, § 626(f)(3), which states that “the 
party asserting the validity of a waiver shall have the burden of 
proving in a court of competent jurisdiction that a waiver was 
knowing and voluntary.”148  The McLeod court held that the plain 
language of the OWBPA requires ADEA waiver cases to be tried in 
court, not through arbitration, reasoning that because Gilmer rested 
on § 626(c)(1), there was room within § 626(f)(3) to hold otherwise.149  
First, the plain language of § 626(f)(3)—by using the term “shall” in 
particular—was very different from § 626(c)(1) (which uses the word 
“may”), and a court must presume that Congress deliberately chose 
to include “shall” in some provisions and not others.150  Second, 
under the plain language of the statute, a “court of competent 
jurisdiction” must refer to a court, not—as General Mills tried to 
argue—an arbitral forum.151 
Thus, McLeod indicates that what constitutes a “court of 
competent jurisdiction” is unresolved, especially where a case 
involves multiple ADEA claims—waiver and non-waiver.  The 
McLeod court held, however, that its conclusion was limited by the 
“narrow circumstances presented in this case: a dispute over the 
validity of a waiver of substantive claims under the OWBPA’s waiver 
requirements found in [§] 626(f)(1).”152  This ambiguity creates 
confusion for both employers and employees regarding where an 
ADEA case can be heard and should be resolved. 
                                                                                                                                         
 144. See infra Section III.B.3. 
 145. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1990). 
 146. Compare Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, with McLeod v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 
3d 843, 855 (D. Minn. 2015). 
 147. 140 F. Supp. 3d 843. 
 148. Id. at 851. 
 149. Id. at 853–54. 
 150. Id. at 855. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 855–56. 
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B. Furthering the Confusion: The Knowing and Voluntary Standard 
for Other Anti-Discrimination Statutes 
While the pre-OWBPA approaches to determining the knowing 
and voluntary standard informed the statutory floor of the OWBPA 
requirements, these approaches nevertheless remain in use by some 
courts across the country when determining whether other anti-
discrimination protections are knowingly and voluntarily waived by 
terminated employees.  Without a clear knowing and voluntary 
standard, employees may not be as aware of the rights they are 
waiving when signing a release agreement as they are when waiving 
age-related claims.  Further, employers are left guessing as to how 
they will effectuate a compliant RIF program.  With clearer standards 
comes increased predictability for both employees and employers. 
Generally, a waiver of discrimination claims is valid when the 
employee knowingly and voluntarily consents to the waiver.153  For 
waivers under the ADEA, as has been described at length above, 
courts look to the statutory provisions outlined in the OWBPA.154  
Under Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes, however, the 
validity of a knowing and voluntary waiver is governed solely by case 
law.155  When evaluating a waiver of claims arising under Title VII or 
the ADA, for example, some courts rely on traditional contract 
principles to determine whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary, 
but most look to the totality of the circumstances.156  The issue of not 
having a clearly articulated knowing and voluntary standard for the 
waiver of non-age-related claims is well described by Professor Daniel 
P. O’Gorman: 
Not only are the circuits in disarray, each of the tests applied by 
them is in disarray.  Courts applying the totality of the circumstances 
test, a test that focuses more on the releasing person’s state of mind 
than a strict contract law test, often apply contract rules, which are 
                                                                                                                                         
 153. See UNDERSTANDING WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS, supra note 47, at 
pt. III. 
 154. See, e.g., Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 427 (1998) (stating 
“the [OWBPA] creates a series of prerequisites for knowing and voluntary waivers 
and imposes affirmative duties of disclosure and waiting periods”); Am. Airlines, Inc. 
v. Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d 111, 117 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that Congress 
enacted the OWBPA to resolve whether the “totality of the circumstances” or 
“ordinary contract principles” was proper to determine “knowing and voluntary” by 
amending the ADEA to mandate that an ADEA waiver contain certain minimum 
information). 
 155. See UNDERSTANDING WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS, supra note 47, at 
pt. III. 
 156. See id. 
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generally objective rules focusing on what a person says and does, 
not what he or she thinks.  Courts applying the contract law test 
often look at factors used under the totality of the circumstances 
test, despite such factors usually being irrelevant under contract law 
principles.157 
The OWBPA has had a substantial impact on how waivers of Title 
VII, the ADA, and other non-age discrimination claims are being 
analyzed by courts,158 though there is currently no official rule 
regarding whether courts should apply the “totality of the 
circumstances” approach or the general contract law approach when 
determining their validity.159  In July of 2009, the EEOC released a 
guidance document summarizing case law in this area, concluding that 
courts determine whether a waiver of rights under Title VII or the 
ADA was knowing and voluntary by looking to factors nearly 
identical to those in the OWBPA.160  This document is indicative of 
the OWBPA’s reach beyond age-related protections and perhaps 
foreshadows the future of waiver provision law for other anti-
discrimination statutes.161  This influence only reinforces the need for 
clarity and predictability. 
                                                                                                                                         
 157. Daniel P. O’Gorman, A State of Disarray: The “Knowing and Voluntary” 
Standard for Releasing Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 78 (2005).  O’Gorman further explained that in the 
context of a Title VII waiver, the central issue is whether a Title VII release should 
be viewed as a waiver of a fundamental or contractual right. Id.  If Title VII is 
determined to be a fundamental right, a more subjective test should be applied, such 
as the “actual intent” theory that focuses on whether the parties had a subjective 
meeting of the minds to determine whether a contract was formed. Id.  If Title VII is 
determined to be a contractual right, a more contractual or objective test would be 
applied, focusing on what the parties said and did, not what they thought. Id.  The 
objective theory has prevailed. Id. 
 158. See generally UNDERSTANDING WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS, supra 
note 47. 
 159. See O’Gorman, supra note 157, at 74–75. 
 160. UNDERSTANDING WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS, supra note 47, at 
pt. III.1 (“These courts consider the following circumstances and conditions under 
which the waiver was signed: whether it was written in a manner that was clear and 
specific enough for the employee to understand based on his education and business 
experience; whether it was induced by fraud, duress, undue influence, or other 
improper conduct by the employer; whether the employee had enough time to read 
and think about the advantages and disadvantages of the agreement before signing it; 
whether the employee consulted with an attorney or was encouraged or discouraged 
by the employer from doing so; whether the employee had any input in negotiating 
the terms of the agreement; and whether the employer offered the employee 
consideration (e.g., severance pay, additional benefits) that exceeded what the 
employee already was entitled to by law or contract and the employee accepted the 
offered consideration.”). 
 161. See infra Section III.B.2. 
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III.  PROPOSING A NEW KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY STANDARD 
This Part both recognizes the successes of the OWBPA and 
proposes new EEOC regulations to bring further clarity to the 
OWBPA.  Additionally, it proposes that the formal structure of the 
OWBPA be extended to other anti-discrimination statutes to ensure 
that employees receive all material information possible before 
waiving any discrimination claim in the case of a layoff or incentivized 
termination. 
The OWBPA has not only had a powerful impact on older 
workers, attributable in part to its relatively straightforward structure 
and clarity, but it also has improved protections for any employee 
subject to RIFs or other similar programs.162  According to a partner 
at a prominent plaintiffs’ law firm, the OWBPA has even had a 
positive ripple effect on those under age forty due to its 
transformation of the consideration periods and revocation rights for 
all employees signing these agreements, regardless of age.163  The 
partner explained that because employers must abide by the waiver 
requirements in the OWBPA during a group termination, some tend 
to follow the same OWBPA standard for all employees involved in 
that particular termination for simplicity’s sake.164  For example, 
employees receive the same time period in which to return their 
waiver and are encouraged to speak to an attorney before signing.  
Therefore, those under age forty receive some of the benefits of 
OWBPA in the group layoff context as well but rarely, if ever, receive 
specific disclosures.165 
A. Making the OWBPA Even More Effective: Clarifying Salient 
Waiver Provisions 
The OWBPA’s relative clarity is one of the reasons for its 
success.166  By providing employers with disclosure responsibilities, 
compliance appears to be within arm’s reach.  However, this is rarely 
the case, and further clarity in a number of salient waiver provisions 
could make this statute even more effective, an important goal given 
its ever-growing importance and influence. 
                                                                                                                                         
 162. See Telephone Interview with Partner, Unnamed Plaintiffs’ Law Firm 
(Oct. 25, 2016) (notes on file with author). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See generally UNDERSTANDING WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS, supra 
note 47. 
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1. Increasing Mandated Disclosure in RIF Exhibits 
The below proposal is intended to remove the secrecy of the RIF 
selection process, keep employees informed regarding the program, 
and, as a result, encourage reduction of discrimination suits. 
Defining “decisional unit” in a RIF exercise within a large 
corporation has proven challenging, and, as a result, further EEOC 
regulations should be issued to alleviate the confusion.167  Currently, 
the EEOC mandates disclosure of the job titles and ages of those in 
the “decisional unit.”168  This instruction provides room for employers 
to manipulate who makes up a “decisional unit,” which could lead to 
inaccurate disclosure and the ability to lawfully conceal potential age 
discrimination.169  The EEOC should issue guidance aimed at tying 
the definition of “job classification and organizational unit” directly 
to management structure by mandating disclosure of not just job title 
and age, but also of corporate organizational data. 
First, the issue of defining “job classification and organizational 
unit” is an understandably difficult one because RIF selections can 
occur in a number of ways: employees can be compared against each 
other on a subunit level or on a larger, departmental level.  For 
example, fictional Company X, as outlined in Figure 1, contains the 
Legal and Compliance Super Department, which can be further 
broken down into the Legal Department and the Compliance 
Department.  There are several subunits within the Legal 
Department, such as the employment law group, the tax group, and 










 167. See generally id. at pt. IV. 
 168. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(4)(iii) (2017) (“In a termination of persons in several 
established grade levels and/or other established subcategories within a job category 
or job title, the information shall be broken down by grade level or other 
subcategory.”). 
 169. See Raczak v. Ameritech Corp., 103 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1997); Hyman, 
supra note 109. 
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Figure 1.  Fictional Company X Organizational Chart Broken down 
by Super Department, Department, and Subunit 
 
 
If a ten-percent RIF was mandated on Company X, which has over 
50,000 employees in the United States, determining the decisional 
unit to be all 50,000 employees could seem preposterous.  However, 
that massive disclosure could technically be considered a decisional 
unit because it is the portion of the employer’s organizational 
structure considered as part of the RIF.170  Employers are unlikely to 
disclose that much information and courts have ruled that doing so 
might actually invalidate the release entirely.171  The ambiguity of the 
“decisional unit” definition under current regulations allows 
                                                                                                                                         
 170. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(1)(iv)(3)(i)(B) (“A ‘decisional unit’ is that portion of 
the employer’s organizational structure from which the employer chose the persons 
who would be offered consideration for the signing of a waiver and those who would 
not be offered consideration for the signing of a waiver. The term ‘decisional unit’ 
has been developed to reflect the process by which an employer chose certain 
employees for a program and ruled out others from that program.”); see also Behr v. 
AADG, Inc., No. 14-CV-3075-CJW, 2016 WL 4119692, at *15 (N.D. Iowa July 29, 
2016) (holding that regardless of size, the EEOC regulation that defined decisional 
unit as the group from which the employer chose the persons affected was proper). 
 171. See Pagliolo v. Guidant Corp., 483 F. Supp. 2d 847, 859 (D. Minn. 2007). 
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companies to disclose a decisional unit that selectively reveals the 
most favorable statistical data for the employer, possibly hiding 
disparate impact red flags.172 
A clearer way to define “decisional unit” would be to uncover the 
exact senior management directive for the RIF, and to tie managerial 
structure to the definition of “decisional unit.”  This proposal is 
exactly in line with the 1998 EEOC Regulation on the issue,173 but 
specifically emphasizes the decision-making process in determining 
the appropriate unit.  The purpose of such an emphasis is to provide 
consistency.  Anchoring all organizational unit composition to 
management decision-making is the most clear, common indicator of 
working groups across workplaces. 
To illustrate, consider a common RIF scenario in which the head of 
the Legal and Compliance Super Department within fictional 
Company X assigned his direct reports (the heads of the Legal 
Department and the Compliance Department) the responsibility of 
determining who to select as part of the ten-percent RIF.  Further 
suppose that the head of the Legal Department then delegated that 
responsibility to the heads of the Tax, Employment Law, and 
Litigation subunits and asked that they recommend specific 
individuals to be terminated, subject to his oversight and ultimate 
sign-off.  The individuals within the Legal Department should be 
considered the “decisional unit” because the head of the Legal 
Department ultimately signed off on his direct report’s selections. 
Defining “decisional unit” based on which manager ultimately 
signed-off on the selected individuals would create a more clear-cut 
rule.  Functionally speaking, a manager who has ultimate authority 
needs to have a working knowledge of who is selected and why, which 
in large companies simply could not be a CEO or Super Department 
head.  This would help preclude problematic over-disclosures because 
a company could not persuasively argue that one individual was 
responsible for determining all of the terminations in a large-scale 
RIF program.  This would also avoid under-disclosure issues, because 
ultimate sign-off would not be done at a highly localized level as 
lower-level employees are generally not entrusted with that authority. 
Guidance that mandates disclosure of not just job title and age, but 
also organizational-related data, would further help clarify 
“decisional unit” for the selected employees.  Selected employees 
                                                                                                                                         
 172. See generally Raczak, 103 F.3d at 1263. 
 173. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(1)(iv)(3)(i)(B) (1998) (“When identifying the scope of 
the ‘class, unit, or group,’ and ‘job classification or organizational unit,’ an employer 
should consider its organizational structure and decision-making process.”). 
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would receive enough information to be able to essentially re-create 
the organizational structure of which they were members.  This re-
creation allows the average employee to understand the applicable 
“decisional unit” without confusion.  If an employee in the 
Employment Law subunit of Company X was selected, for example, 
the disclosure would contain not only job title and age of those in the 
“decisional unit,” but also subunit data and department data.  A 
plaintiff’s attorney could then evaluate if there was age discrimination 
at the subunit or department level, which is impossible to determine 
in a disclosure issued pursuant to current EEOC guidance. 
2. Clarifying “Eligibility Factors” 
EEOC regulations should be issued to refine the definition of 
“eligibility factors” to include what criteria, such as job performance, 
experience, or seniority, an employer relied on in determining RIF 
selection.174  The EEOC regulations currently only include the 
generic statement, “[a]ll persons in the Construction Division are 
eligible for the program” as an example of an acceptable eligibility 
factor disclosure, which gives employees little actual knowledge about 
selection criteria and could enable employers to easily disguise 
discriminatory motives.175  Employers may be concealing important 
information from those who are receiving these waivers.  By 
redefining “eligibility factors” to include the factors that the employer 
considered when selecting RIF participants, employees selected 
would get important information that would inform their knowledge 
of the validity of an age discrimination claim under the ADEA. 
3. Keeping Age Claims in a Court of Law 
Lastly, an ADEA waiver case should be handled in a court of law, 
not by an arbitrator.  Thus, this Note proposes that a court should 
focus on the plain language of § 626(f)(3) and not look to the 
language of § 626(c)(1) as the Gilmer Court did.176  This proposal is 
consistent with literature that suggests that employees have fared 
much worse in arbitration of statutory employment claims than in 
judicially-managed claims.177  It is also consistent with the passage of 
                                                                                                                                         
 174. See Pagliolo, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 860–61. 
 175. See generally Behr v. AADG, Inc., No. 14-CV-3075-CJW, 2016 WL 4119692, 
at *14 (N.D. Iowa July 29, 2016). 
 176. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23–24 (1990). 
 177. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: 
Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury? 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 412–13 
(2007). 
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the ADEA, generally, as Congress has made clear through that 
statute that age waivers deserve enhanced protection;178 thus, it 
follows that such litigation should be handled in this manner as a 
result of many policy considerations, elaborated on below. 
In addition to its role in reducing valuable case law that could 
clarify the OWBPA, arbitration of ADEA claims can be problematic 
for three additional policy reasons, all of which harm employee 
protections.  The issues of the repeat player bias, employee win rates, 
and employee recovery figures all point in the direction of arbitration 
not being a “court of competent jurisdiction” for purposes of 
litigating age-related claims.179  The repeat player bias is based on the 
concept that a party that participates in a conflict resolution process 
multiple times will have an advantage over a party that participates 
only once.180  With regard to employment arbitration, there is concern 
that employers will have an advantage as repeat players because they 
will likely participate in multiple arbitration cases, whereas the 
employees will likely participate in only one.181  “Given that 
employment arbitrators rely on being selected to decide cases for 
their livelihood, the danger is that arbitrators will have a bias in favor 
of the repeat player employer in hope of being selected by the 
employer to hear future cases.”182  In a study conducted by Lisa 
Bingham in the 1990s, “employers who participated in multiple 
arbitration cases were significantly more likely to win their case than 
employers who only participated in a single case.”183  For the repeat 
players, the employee win rate was 23.3% and for the non-repeat 
players, the employee win rate was 67%.184  Though evidence 
indicating that such a bias exists is limited, it does suggest that further 
investigation into these discrepancies is warranted.185 
In a 2011 study comparing overall trial outcomes in mandatory 
arbitration and litigation conducted by Professor Alexander Colvin, 
from the Industrial and Labor Relations School at Cornell University, 
and Professor Katherine Stone, from the UCLA School of Law, 
employee win rates are much lower in mandatory arbitration than 
                                                                                                                                         
 178. See S. REP. NO. 101-79 at 968 (1989). 
 179. See generally Colvin, supra note 177, at 406. 
 180. See id. at 427. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See id. at 428–29. 
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they are in either federal or state court.186  The study found that 
employees in mandatory arbitration win 21.4% of the time, compared 
to 36.4% in federal court and 57% in state courts.187  This conclusion is 
particularly problematic in the face of the Supreme Court’s rationale 
for the holding in Gilmer, that “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory 
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the 
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a 
judicial, forum.”188  That sentiment seems to not necessarily be true 
given that the outcome of a litigated right will likely be different if 
argued in one forum over the other.189  The purpose of the ADEA, 
after all, is to prohibit age discrimination in employment by 
protecting the rights of older workers.190  Without consistency in 
outcome, the purpose of the Act is thwarted. 
Lastly, the issue of damages favors keeping ADEA claims out of 
arbitration.191  According to Colvin and Stone’s study, the differences 
in damages awarded in arbitration versus federal or state courts are 
significant.192  A typical mandatory arbitration award is only twenty-
one percent of the median award in the federal courts and forty-three 
percent of the median award in the state courts.193  In order to ensure 
that the ADEA is fulfilling its purpose, employers must be faced with 
some degree of discipline should they not comply with the statute.  
Bringing ADEA claims to arbitration weakens the deterrent effect of 
the Act because employee awards are significantly lower than they 
would have been if brought to court. 
Genuine concern exists around the neutrality of the arbitration 
forum.  As a result, such claims should be litigated in the most neutral 
legal forum.  This is consistent with Congress’ desire to hold age-
related waiver claims to the higher knowing and voluntary 
standard.194 
                                                                                                                                         
 186. KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, THE ARBITRATION 
EPIDEMIC: MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF 
THEIR RIGHTS, ECON. POL’Y INST. 3 (2015). 
 187. Id. at 20. 
 188. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1990). 
 189. See Colvin, supra note 177, at 420–21. 
 190. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2012) (“It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to 
promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to 
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers 
find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.”). 
 191. See generally Colvin, supra note 177, at 420–24. 
 192. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 186, at 21. 
 193. See id. at 20. 
 194. See S. REP. NO. 101-79, at 968 (1989). 
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B. The Future of the Knowing and Voluntary Standard 
This Note proposes that Congress adopt an OWBPA-like waiver 
rule for other anti-discrimination statutes, such as Title VII and the 
ADA, to resolve the issue of how the knowing and voluntary 
standard should be interpreted when waiving these rights.195  The 
following section will specifically address only Title VII and the 
ADA; this Note, however, does not propose that the change stops 
there.  Instead, this Note uses these two statutes as a starting point for 
what could be an evolution in how courts evaluate the knowing and 
voluntary standard for waivers.  This Note highlights Title VII and 
the ADA due to the volume of individuals that the statutes protect 
and the likely probability that employers will have this information 
available about their workforces to include in a disclosure. 
Because it would be preposterous for an employer to offer a race 
or sex-based exit incentive program, this Note proposes that in the 
context of large-scale RIF programs, § 626(f)(1) should become 
standard text required in all anti-discrimination statutes.196  Professor 
Cynthia Estlund, from New York University School of Law, 
introduced a similar theory that the OWBPA should serve as a 
“useful legal template for regulating the waiver of other existing 
employment claims,” but stated so merely in passing.197 
As mentioned in Part II, “totality of the circumstances” factors 
were the basis of the disclosure factors enumerated under the 
OWBPA.198  Both age and non-age discrimination claims were 
evaluated under similar factors prior to the passage of the OWBPA, 
such as whether the employee who released his claims was 
represented by an attorney, whether the settlement was in writing, 
and whether the language in the settlement was clear to the 
employee.199  Recognizing that the origin of many of the OWBPA 
                                                                                                                                         
 195. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration 
Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 442 (2006) (“[I]n practice, the OWBPA is serving as a 
broader template: because ADEA claims may be included in the single broad waiver 
that employers often seek from employees at the time of severance, employers are 
well advised to, and often do, follow the relatively stringent standard of the 
OWBPA.”). 
 196. Under this proposal, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H) would read: “if a waiver is 
requested in connection with an employment termination program offered . . . ” 
[emphasis added]. 
 197. See Estlund, supra note 195, at 442. 
 198. See UNDERSTANDING WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS, supra note 47, at 
pt. III–IV. 
 199. See DiMartino v. City of Hartford, 636 F. Supp. 1241, 1247 (D. Conn. 1986). 
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factors came from the “totality of the circumstances” test suggests 
that enumerating the waiver requirements of other anti-
discrimination statutes that also rely on the “totality of 
circumstances” test for enforcement would be logical.200 
One critical aspect of the OWBPA that deviates from the typical 
“totality of the circumstances” analysis is the use of disclosures.201  
Age disclosures under the ADEA should be modified to fit waivers 
covering other claims of discrimination to ensure that terminated 
employees have enough information to adequately determine if they 
would like to waive those rights.  For example, under Title VII, a 
requirement mandating the disclosure of gender, race, and ethnicity 
of those terminated would be useful.  The definition of “decisional 
unit” would remain the same as the one this Note proposes above, but 
instead of simply disclosing the ages and groups within which the 
employee was selected, other demographic information would be 
included.  This would extend to the ADA as well.  If an employer 
would like a terminated employee to waive any ADA claim, the 
employer would be required to include a disclosure of those who fall 
under the ADA’s protection within the “decisional unit” from which 
the terminated employee was selected.  The knowing and voluntary 
standard would, therefore, be elevated under this proposed disclosure 
system, just like it has under the OWBPA.  This proposal places a 
higher burden on employers to strongly consider and monitor the 
make-up of their workforces, because such information will be 
disclosed in a layoff. 
To put this portion of the proposal in context with the proposal for 
a more robust disclosure, Figure 2 outlines a sample excerpt of an 
ideal release agreement disclosure based on the Company X example.  
Not only is age disclosed in the release exhibit, but sex, race, and 










 200. See generally id. 
 201. See generally UNDERSTANDING WAIVERS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS, supra 
note 47. 
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Figure 2.  Fictional Company X Release Agreement Disclosure 
 
Under this proposal, Title VII disclosure would be limited to 
organizations required by the EEOC to file EEO-1 reports since it 
would be difficult, from an information-gathering perspective, for 
smaller organizations to mandate disclosure of race, ethnicity, and 
gender of its employees.202  All companies that meet the following 
criteria are required to file the EEO-1 report annually: (1) subject to 
Title VII with 100 or more employees; (2) subject to Title VII with 
fewer than 100 employees if the company is owned by or corporately 
affiliated with another company and the entire enterprise employs a 
total of 100 or more employees; or (3) federal government prime 
contracts or first-tier subcontractors with fifty or more employees and 
a prime contractor or first-tier subcontract amount to $50,000 or 
more.203  Under this proposal, organizations already required to 
produce EEO-1 reports would be obligated, in the context of a RIF, 
                                                                                                                                         
 202. See EEO-1 Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/faq.cfm#About 
[http://perma.cc/V2L5-2GWV] (“The EEO-1 Report is a compliance survey 
mandated by federal statute and regulations requiring company employment data to 
be categorized by race/ethnicity, gender and job category.”). 
 203. Id. 
Release Agreement Disclosure 
Company X 
 
Scope of RIF: 10 firm-wide reduction 
Selection criteria: low-performers 




Job Title Age Sex Race/ethnicity Disability Department Subunit 
Selected Attorney 44 Female Puerto Rican No Legal Tax 
Not Selected Attorney 48 Female Asian Yes Legal Tax 
Not Selected Paralegal 26 Male White No Legal Tax 
Selected Attorney 50 Male African American Yes Legal Employment 
Selected Paralegal 35 Female Native Hawaiian Yes Legal Litigation 
Not Selected Attorney 42 Female White Yes Legal Litigation 
… … … … … … … … 
 
*… signifies that there would be further disclosures (the above is just a snapshot of a few of the  
individuals in the decisional unit) 
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to disclose gender, race, and ethnicity information in a release 
agreement exhibit. 
Regarding ADA disclosures, instead of sharing details about an 
employee’s specific disability, this Note proposes including whether 
or not one exists.  This Note recognizes the importance of anonymity, 
especially when it comes to disability information.  However, a simple 
yes or no in the “Disability” column of the example disclosure above 
will continue to protect employee privacy. 
One can argue that this proposal seems lofty, especially from a 
monetary perspective because employers would have to bear the cost 
of running robust data analytics on RIF decisional units as well as 
bear the risk of having to disclose such information.  Though this may 
be the case, this deeper analysis will force employers to choose who 
they select for termination more carefully, and perhaps who they hire 
into their organizations as well.  Moreover, this proposal may also 
save employers time and money in the long run by eliminating 
frivolous discrimination suits.  With the data required to be disclosed 
under this proposal, both the employer and employee would better 
know where they stood regarding the merits of any lawsuit.  
Employers and terminated employees would spend less time in 
discovery and more time evaluating the merits of a case.  Thus, this 
proposal could be effective on multiple fronts. 
CONCLUSION 
The OWBPA has been successful because it has disciplined 
employers to operate under a system of waiver disclosures with harsh 
consequences of non-compliance while also providing employees with 
information they need to determine whether an age waiver was made 
knowingly and voluntarily.  Nevertheless, there is still room for clarity 
that could make the OWBPA even more effective.  With an 
increasing number of older employees in the workforce, the time to 
act is now.  The most pressing issues involve the currently malleable 
definition of “decisional unit,” ambiguous disclosure requirements, 
and whether to allow ADEA claims to be arbitrated.  Furthermore, 
the OWBPA’s codification of knowing and voluntary should be 
extended to other anti-discrimination laws such as Title VII and the 
ADA.  The OWBPA could and should serve as a model for what it 
means for an employee to waive his rights knowingly and voluntarily. 
